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The logical starting-point for a discussion of a basic-
needs strategy for Kenya is the 1972 ¡LO report on
employment, incomes and equality in Kenya (ILO,
1972). Although it did not use the term this report
was essentially about basic needs. The focus of
earlier reports on 'unemployment' was explicitly
rejected (e.g. p. 9) and the problem was defined as
that of poverty and inequality. The whole strategy
was aimed at achieving minimum income targets
which "might be (p.109) . . . for rural households,
120 sh. by 1978 and 180 sh. by 1985, and for urban
households 200 sh. and 250 sh. respectively" (in
shillings per month at 1971 prices). It was also
recognised that these targets were only a "shorthand
expression for the real components of a minimum
standard of living, namely nutrition, housing,
clothing, public utilities, access to amenities, etc."
(p.110). Specific real targets mentioned included the
elimination of malnutrition, clean water at a
reasonable distance and access to basic health
services and to basic education (to be expressed "in
such terms as distance from schools and clinics,
teacher-pupil ratios, and number of physicians and
other health personnel per head of population").
The official response to the ¡LO report's strategy of
continued expansion, a wider sharing of the benefits,
national integration of the economy and an attack on
extreme imbalances and disparities, in the Sessional
Paper on Employment (Republic of Kenya, 1973),
was quite favourable. In general it found "the report
to be original and innovative, particularly in terms of
the broad social and economic framework of
analysis within which the problems of unemployment
and poverty are examined" (p.ii). However, not all
of the report's proposals were endorsed in the
sessional paper and the 1974-78 development plan
(Republic of Kenya, 1974), and implementation has
been selective.
¡LO recommendations which have been implemented
include those for the unification of tariff rates,
including intermediate and capital goods (many of
them previously duty-free); the abolition of
investment allowances in Nairobi and Mombasa; an
export subsidy; an increase in the rate of corporation
tax on branches of foreign companies and in the rate
of withholding tax on dividends paid to non-
residents and on all payments to foreign suppliers of
services; a 10 per cent sales tax on all manufactured
goods, with essentials such as foodstuffs and
agricultural supplies exempted and 'luxury items'
taxed at a higher rate; the abolition of graduated
personal tax and consumption tax and the
introduction of a capital gains tax; the acceptance of
site-and-service housing schemes; the abolition of the
tax on traditional liquor and of the licensing of taxi-
drivers; the abolition of fees for the first four years of
primary school; a rural works programme (although
on a very small scale); and some pilot agricultural
projects intended to reach smaller farmers.
ILO recommendations which have not been
implemented include those for a progressive land tax,
subdivision of land and (as a later possibility) a
ceiling on individual land holdings; the ending of the
demolition of slum housing and informal-sector
business premises, unless for a "positive and
overriding development reason", and of "counter-
productive harassment" of traders, taxi-drivers,
vagrants, etc.; and an incomes policy under which
"those who earn less than £200 a year should receive
a maximum annual rate of increase of 3 per cent;
those in the £200 to £700 group a maximum of less
than 3 per cent, and those with incomes over £700
shall have a wage freeze except for increases
attributable to promotions or annual increments".
In short, while it is true that many of the ILO
report's recommendations have been implemented,
implementation has been distinctly patchy. Some of
the measures taken are perhaps surprising in the
extent to which they confront vested interests (e.g. the
capital gains tax, taxation of luxury goods, abolition
of investment allowance) but measures implying
structural upheaval, such as land ceilings and
redistribution, land tax and a freeze on the incomes
of the higher paid, have been avoided.
The problem is that the ILO strategy, while perhaps
not constituting a totally indivisible package,
contains a core of mutually reinforcing recommen-
dations. In particular, the recommendations on the
structure of rewards, land policy, technology,
protection, the informal sector and education seem to
be inextricably linked to each other. For example,
the educational reforms recommended would not
work in the absence of a substantial change in the
structure of rewards. Thus partial implementation is
likely to be ineffective and may even in some respects
make matters worse.
In effect the economy is still at a crossroads as far as
strategy is concerned. As the pre-recession 197 1/72
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balance-of-payments crisis showed, it is near the end
of the easy stage of import substitution. There are
now two broad options for further industrialisation.
The first, in the spirit of the ILO report, is that of
widening the internal mass market by investment and
other policies which benefit those at the bottom of the
income scale at the expense of those at the top. The
second, in the spirit of the recent World Bank report
(World Bank. 1975), is that of achieving greater
efficiency in resource use by "restructuring the
pattern" and "reforming the process" of growth, that
is by shifting the emphasis towards the more
efficient sectors and sub-sectors--from industry to
agriculture, from import-substituting to export
processing industry, from infrastructure and services
to directly productive sectors, etc.--and by improving
efficiency within each sector and sub-sector, "getting
the prices right" and removing biases in exchange
rates, interest rates and product prices. The first
option, with its emphasis on redistribution and
intervention in the market, is consistent with meeting
basic needs; the second, with its emphasis on market
criteria of efficiency, is the antithesis of a basic needs
strategy. The ILO report recommendations which
have been implemented so far are largely those that
are common to either strategy, so the options are
still open.
1f the basic needs/redistribution option were chosen,
it would need to be recognised, perhaps more than
did the ILO report, that it represents a rejection of
market criteria of efficiency. Polarisation and
poverty are only partly due to the state interference
emphasized by the report (particularly in the section
on the informal sector); in an important sense they
arc inherent in the operation of markets, particularly
in an economy which is as open to transnational
influences as Kenya's is.
For instance, in general the dominance of the formal
sector is certainly due to support from the State,
particularly the protection it offers from imports and
other market entrants. But the need for protection
from other market entrants arises from the small size
of the market and the less-than-optimum scale of
operations that it imposes. As markets grow,
economies of scale shift the unit cost advantage to
mass-produced formal-sector goods away from the
cheap-labour-intensive products of the informal
sector. This has already happened in the case of many
industries in Kenya (e.g. textiles, footwear).
Moreover, in other consumer-goods industries the
formal sector has a market advantage deriving from
the way in which it has redefined the needs of
consumers, often spending vast amounts on
advertising, packaging and marketing for this
purpose hut also benefiting from the general spread
of acquisitive consumerism in society.
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A basic-needs strategy in Kenya would thus involve
looking very carefully from this perspective at the
nature of the products of the consumer-goods
manufacturers in the formal sector. How many would
not be competitive with smaller firms without state
support of various kinds? How many have a real unit
cost advantage over smaller firms in meeting
relatively un-redefined needs? And how many derive
their market power primarily from redefining needs
in a way that conflicts with a basic-needs strategy?
There are several ways in which such redefinition
might conflict with a basic needs strategy. The most
obvious is where a direct conflict with one of the basic
needs, such as nutrition, may arise. For instance,
Stewart (1977) has documented the redefinition of
Kenyan demand for maize flour away from ordinary
posho, produced by labour-intensive methods,
towards the packaged, branded, sweeter, whiter,
finer and less nutritious sifted flour, produced by
roller mills. A second conflict may arise through the
diversion of household expenditure towards redefined
and less efficient (from the point of view of
satisfying basic needs) household consumption. For
example, Langdon (1974) has shown how advertising
campaigns stressing theimportance ofthe appearance
and image of branded, packaged, perfumed, machine-
made soap has ousted hand-produced soap which is
functionally superior, uses ingredients of better
quality, lasts longer and is cheaper per unit of
cleaning power from urban markets in Kenya. A
third set of conflicts arises from the effects
(emphasized in theILO report) of firms of this kind
on the structure of supply----the displacement of
small-scale labour-intensive producers and the
discouragement of local technological awareness and
capacity, the limited labour absorption, the absence
of linkages with the rest of the economy and the
tendency towards concentration in Nairobi.
The implications for policy of such an examination
of the nature of the products of the consumer-goods
manufacturers in the formal sector would vary
according to the diagnosis. State protection against
cömpetition from other market entrants (but not
necessarily protection against imports) would be
withdrawn in those cases where this was the sole
basis of a formal-sector firm's market advantage.
Advertising for the purpose of redefining consumer
needs in a way that conflicts with a basic-needs
strategy would be banned, and there might be a case
for banning a/I advertising of consumer goods except
at the point of sale. There might also be a need for
government to play an active role n designing and
producing alternative goods consistent with the
overall strategy.
As well as redesigning the structure of consumer
goods production a basic needs strategy would imply
restructuring government services. This could be
represented as the making of counter bids by
government on behalf of the more deprived areas and
groups against the demands of the market and of the
political system. In the case of health services, for
instance, the effective demand of the higher-income
groups mainly located in urban areas of the
international market and of harambee (self-help)
health centres built in the more prosperous rural
areas largely determines the nature and pattern of
health caret in the absence of strong intervention.
Thus a 'quota system' based on need rather than
merely on geographical area would be implied.
Within agriculture a basic needs approach to food
and nutrition would imply a complete reorientation
of strategy, with less emphasis on export cash crops,
large farms, progressive smallholders in high-
potential areas and more on food for local
consumption. This shift, involving research, extension
and other public services to agriculture, would be
aimed at increasing food production for own
consumption, increasing the availability of food on
local markets and raising its nutrient quality, as well
as at increasing cash incomes. Land redistribution
would also be necessary, as a means of ensuring a
larger and more equally distributed output and
reducing migratory pressure on the towns and
marginal areas. lt would need to be combined,
however, with continuing measures to counteract the
polarising tendencies of Kenyan-style rural develop-
ment.
The strategy would also imply a need for a further
narrowingofpaydifferentialsin the public and private
formal sectors. The allocation of 33 per cent of the
government's current budget to the Ministry of
Education in the 1974-78 plan, the ineffectiveness of
attempts at educational reform and the diversion of
household expenditure towards schooling fees and
expenses are a reflection of the irresistible pull of the
dysfunctionally high rewards obtained by the
schooled (but not by the skilled). The redesign of the
structure of production and of government services,
together with other redistributive measures would in
any case, imply a drastic remoulding of hierarchical
managerial systems and of the nature of the
professions, which would complement a narrowing
of pay differentials. The managerial cadre of the
multi national corporation and the internationally
mobile professionals would be among the main
losers from such changes and could he expected to
oppose them.2
I Redistribution of inconsevoutd nove need ami effective demand
ciosu tofether, hut, in the absence of complete equality, a gap would
ce ma in
2 See Godfrey (1977) for further discussion of the intplications of a
basic needs stratcg\ tor the pritessions.
Finally, meeting basic needs is not costless and a
method of provision which at least is not a deduction
from capital accumulation is to be preferred. Also
the labour-absorptive capacity of the formal sector,
while likely to be increased by the structural changes
envisaged, would still be limited; capital intensive
methods would still be used where they were
unequivocally more efficient. Both these considera-
tions imply a need to explore even more carefully the
ways in which surplus labour could be put to
productive use, either in projects which provide
directly for basic needs, such as rural water schemes,
or which generate the surplus to finance the costs
(particularly the current costs) of basic-needs
projects. The current rural works programme is an
example of such an approach but its use of central
finance and administration is likely to limit theextent
of its impact.
Much more in the spirit of a basic needs strategy
would be community-based participatory projects. In
Kenya's case a question at least worth investigating is
the extent to which the harambee movement lends
itself to such a purpose. As things stand it must be
frankly recognised that large-scale harambee
represents a bid for resources from the centre rather
than a substitute for such resources. But this is not
always the case with smaller projects. lt may be that
the individualisation of land tenure and rural
differentiation are destroying the basis of such
communal labour use, but it would be worth finding
out if this is so and if it is irreversible.
By now it will have become apparent that there is a
striking similarity between the programme implied
for Kenya by a basic needs objective and the
unimplemented remainder of the ILO report's
recommendations. The unbiocking of market
opportunities for smaller firms, restructuring of
consumer goods production, a quota system for
government services, reorientation of agricultural
policy, land redistribution, narrowing of pay
differentials, community-based participatory pro-
jectsthe emphases may be slightly different, but all
have a familiar ring about them.
Thus a basic needs strategy raises once again in an
acute form the question asked by Leys about the ILO
mission's proposals:
"The obvious puzzle presented by these proposals
is what incentive the mission thought all these
groups3-- -the heart and soul of the alliance of
domestic and foreign capitalmight possibly have
for niakirig such sacrifices. Apart from anything
3 "the peopte who had fought their way to positions of power and
wealth in the Kenyatta regime-ministers. MPs, counciltors, KANU
office-holders and their various clientetes".
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else, there was at least a family resemblance between
the mission's package of proposals and the essen-
tials of the KPU's former programme. The KPU
had not of course worked out a programme as fully
or with as much sophistication as the mission; but
then the mission did not, for its part, seem to have
pondered the significance of the suppression of the
KPU. What did the mission think would induce
the Kenyatta regime to do in the 1970s what it had
not only not done, but had destroyed its opponents
for advocating, in the 1960s?"
(Leys, 1975: 262).
Leys' rather static approach may lead to an
underestimation of the room for manoeuvre. We
have seen, for instance, that implementation of ILO
recommendations has extended beyond what a
mechanical reading off of dominant interest groups
would have suggested. But the core of the programme,
including the measures that would be necessary to a
basic needs strategy, has not been implemented. To
be frank, it is not much easier to give a convincing
answer to Leys than it was three years agoand his
question remains uncomfortably the first one to be
answered by all those advocating basic needs
strategies for existing governments, not just in Kenya
but in any country.
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